Thanks for the reply.
Hmmmm… interesting. The TOR log looks more or less normal to me. I did a restart though.
I also “resynced” CLN, this will take some hours.
This is my current TOR log. It mentions attacks or “me using it wrong” here and there, but I get those messages also on my MacBook usually, and I can browse the internet over TOR there.
2025-01-16T14:27:48+01:00 Starting tor@default.service - Anonymizing overlay network for TCP...
2025-01-16T14:27:48+01:00 Jan 16 13:27:48.172 [notice] Tor 0.4.8.9 running on Linux with Libevent 2.1.12-stable, OpenSSL 3.0.11, Zlib 1.2.13, Liblzma 5.4.1, Libzstd 1.5.4 and Glibc 2.36 as libc.
2025-01-16T14:27:48+01:00 Jan 16 13:27:48.172 [notice] Tor can't help you if you use it wrong! Learn how to be safe at https://support.torproject.org/faq/staying-anonymous/
2025-01-16T14:27:48+01:00 Jan 16 13:27:48.173 [notice] Read configuration file "/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc".
2025-01-16T14:27:48+01:00 Jan 16 13:27:48.173 [notice] Read configuration file "/etc/tor/torrc".
2025-01-16T14:27:48+01:00 Configuration was valid
2025-01-16T14:27:48+01:00 Jan 16 13:27:48.192 [notice] Tor 0.4.8.9 running on Linux with Libevent 2.1.12-stable, OpenSSL 3.0.11, Zlib 1.2.13, Liblzma 5.4.1, Libzstd 1.5.4 and Glibc 2.36 as libc.
2025-01-16T14:27:48+01:00 Jan 16 13:27:48.192 [notice] Tor can't help you if you use it wrong! Learn how to be safe at https://support.torproject.org/faq/staying-anonymous/
2025-01-16T14:27:48+01:00 Jan 16 13:27:48.192 [notice] Read configuration file "/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc".
2025-01-16T14:27:48+01:00 Jan 16 13:27:48.192 [notice] Read configuration file "/etc/tor/torrc".
2025-01-16T14:27:48+01:00 Jan 16 13:27:48.193 [warn] You specified a public address '0.0.0.0:9050' for SocksPort. Other people on the Internet might find your computer and use it as an open proxy. Please don't allow this unless you have a good reason.
2025-01-16T14:27:48+01:00 Jan 16 13:27:48.193 [notice] Opening Socks listener on 0.0.0.0:9050
2025-01-16T14:27:48+01:00 Jan 16 13:27:48.193 [notice] Opened Socks listener connection (ready) on 0.0.0.0:9050
2025-01-16T14:27:48+01:00 Jan 16 13:27:48.193 [notice] Opening Control listener on 127.0.0.1:9051
2025-01-16T14:27:48+01:00 Jan 16 13:27:48.193 [notice] Opened Control listener connection (ready) on 127.0.0.1:9051
2025-01-16T14:27:48+01:00 We compiled with OpenSSL 300000b0: OpenSSL 3.0.11 19 Sep 2023 and we are running with OpenSSL 300000b0: 3.0.11. These two versions should be binary compatible.
2025-01-16T14:27:48+01:00 Tor 0.4.8.9 running on Linux with Libevent 2.1.12-stable, OpenSSL 3.0.11, Zlib 1.2.13, Liblzma 5.4.1, Libzstd 1.5.4 and Glibc 2.36 as libc.
2025-01-16T14:27:48+01:00 Tor can't help you if you use it wrong! Learn how to be safe at https://support.torproject.org/faq/staying-anonymous/
2025-01-16T14:27:48+01:00 Read configuration file "/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc".
2025-01-16T14:27:48+01:00 Read configuration file "/etc/tor/torrc".
2025-01-16T14:27:48+01:00 You specified a public address '0.0.0.0:9050' for SocksPort. Other people on the Internet might find your computer and use it as an open proxy. Please don't allow this unless you have a good reason.
2025-01-16T14:27:48+01:00 Opening Socks listener on 0.0.0.0:9050
2025-01-16T14:27:48+01:00 Opened Socks listener connection (ready) on 0.0.0.0:9050
2025-01-16T14:27:48+01:00 Opening Control listener on 127.0.0.1:9051
2025-01-16T14:27:48+01:00 Opened Control listener connection (ready) on 127.0.0.1:9051
2025-01-16T14:27:48+01:00 Parsing GEOIP IPv4 file /usr/share/tor/geoip.
2025-01-16T14:27:48+01:00 Parsing GEOIP IPv6 file /usr/share/tor/geoip6.
2025-01-16T14:27:48+01:00 Bootstrapped 0% (starting): Starting
2025-01-16T14:27:48+01:00 Starting with guard context "default"
2025-01-16T14:27:48+01:00 Signaled readiness to systemd
2025-01-16T14:27:48+01:00 Started tor@default.service - Anonymizing overlay network for TCP.
2025-01-16T14:27:49+01:00 New control connection opened from 127.0.0.1.
2025-01-16T14:27:49+01:00 Opening Control listener on /run/tor/control
2025-01-16T14:27:49+01:00 Opened Control listener connection (ready) on /run/tor/control
2025-01-16T14:27:49+01:00 Bootstrapped 5% (conn): Connecting to a relay
2025-01-16T14:27:50+01:00 Bootstrapped 10% (conn_done): Connected to a relay
2025-01-16T14:27:50+01:00 Bootstrapped 14% (handshake): Handshaking with a relay
2025-01-16T14:27:50+01:00 Bootstrapped 15% (handshake_done): Handshake with a relay done
2025-01-16T14:27:50+01:00 Bootstrapped 20% (onehop_create): Establishing an encrypted directory connection
2025-01-16T14:27:50+01:00 Bootstrapped 25% (requesting_status): Asking for networkstatus consensus
2025-01-16T14:27:50+01:00 Bootstrapped 30% (loading_status): Loading networkstatus consensus
2025-01-16T14:27:50+01:00 I learned some more directory information, but not enough to build a circuit: We have no usable consensus.
2025-01-16T14:27:50+01:00 Bootstrapped 40% (loading_keys): Loading authority key certs
2025-01-16T14:27:50+01:00 The current consensus has no exit nodes. Tor can only build internal paths, such as paths to onion services.
2025-01-16T14:27:50+01:00 Bootstrapped 45% (requesting_descriptors): Asking for relay descriptors
2025-01-16T14:27:50+01:00 I learned some more directory information, but not enough to build a circuit: We need more microdescriptors: we have 0/7954, and can only build 0% of likely paths. (We have 0% of guards bw, 0% of midpoint bw, and 0% of end bw (no exits in consensus, using mid) = 0% of path bw.)
2025-01-16T14:27:51+01:00 Bootstrapped 50% (loading_descriptors): Loading relay descriptors
2025-01-16T14:27:51+01:00 The current consensus contains exit nodes. Tor can build exit and internal paths.
2025-01-16T14:27:52+01:00 Bootstrapped 55% (loading_descriptors): Loading relay descriptors
2025-01-16T14:27:52+01:00 Bootstrapped 63% (loading_descriptors): Loading relay descriptors
2025-01-16T14:27:52+01:00 Bootstrapped 72% (loading_descriptors): Loading relay descriptors
2025-01-16T14:27:52+01:00 Bootstrapped 75% (enough_dirinfo): Loaded enough directory info to build circuits
2025-01-16T14:27:53+01:00 Bootstrapped 90% (ap_handshake_done): Handshake finished with a relay to build circuits
2025-01-16T14:27:53+01:00 Bootstrapped 95% (circuit_create): Establishing a Tor circuit
2025-01-16T14:27:53+01:00 Bootstrapped 100% (done): Done
2025-01-16T14:27:58+01:00 Guard spire3 ($B32F57F3DBD9E50D68A28EA38D3E51910428CFD1) is failing more circuits than usual. Most likely this means the Tor network is overloaded. Success counts are 90/151. Use counts are 74/74. 90 circuits completed, 0 were unusable, 0 collapsed, and 0 timed out. For reference, your timeout cutoff is 60 seconds.
2025-01-16T14:27:58+01:00 Guard spire3 ($B32F57F3DBD9E50D68A28EA38D3E51910428CFD1) is failing a very large amount of circuits. Most likely this means the Tor network is overloaded, but it could also mean an attack against you or potentially the guard itself. Success counts are 90/181. Use counts are 74/74. 90 circuits completed, 0 were unusable, 0 collapsed, and 0 timed out. For reference, your timeout cutoff is 60 seconds.
2025-01-16T14:27:58+01:00 Guard TorRelay1c ($255CC3EA8DB03A9E45EAA7D2CE8A05A4F26F0457) is failing more circuits than usual. Most likely this means the Tor network is overloaded. Success counts are 85/151. Use counts are 24/24. 85 circuits completed, 0 were unusable, 0 collapsed, and 0 timed out. For reference, your timeout cutoff is 60 seconds.
2025-01-16T14:27:58+01:00 Guard TorRelay1c ($255CC3EA8DB03A9E45EAA7D2CE8A05A4F26F0457) is failing a very large amount of circuits. Most likely this means the Tor network is overloaded, but it could also mean an attack against you or potentially the guard itself. Success counts are 85/171. Use counts are 24/24. 85 circuits completed, 0 were unusable, 0 collapsed, and 0 timed out. For reference, your timeout cutoff is 60 seconds.
2025-01-16T14:27:58+01:00 Your network connection speed appears to have changed. Resetting timeout to 60000ms after 18 timeouts and 298 buildtimes.