Question about RPC onion access over Tor (non-browser clients)

Services Support
1

I’m adding support in a Rust application to make Bitcoin RPC calls to my Start9 Knots node over Tor, using the locally running Tor SOCKS proxy (127.0.0.1:9050).

The RPC onion interface is present and copyable in the Start9 UI (just like the LAN .local RPC endpoint), and RPC works fine over .local.

However, when attempting to access the RPC onion endpoint via a non-browser client (Reqwest over SOCKS5h), the connection fails, while Tor itself is confirmed running and functional.

This leads me to two questions:

  1. Is the RPC onion bound to a different Tor authentication / isolation context than system Tor (9050)?
  2. Or is the RPC onion intended only for browser-mediated access (e.g. via Tor Browser / Start9 UI), rather than programmatic RPC clients?

In short: should RPC onion be expected to behave equivalently to the LAN RPC endpoint for non-browser clients over Tor, or are there intentional constraints that prevent this use case?

Thanks — just trying to understand the intended behavior and threat model before going any further.

2

We can close this one out. I found documentation elsewhere here to use :8332 port on the end. All works now.